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The Definition of Consciousness
Me, I, My and Us, the MIMU of Self
BY LYNARD – JANUARY 2021

Life begins with the first breath. Consciousness begins with the first touch.

Neurology would seem to have an advantage in defining consciousness. After all, neurology starts with what we assume is a basic: the brain.

When 17th century philosopher and mathematician Rene Descartes pronounced “I think, therefore I am”, he confined consciousness unto himself. Or, more broadly, to the individual, thereby laying the foundation of the concept of independent agency of the individual. It is a neat trick because, as discussed later, we are biologically programmed to accept the “am” as an “I”. This does not necessarily mean that the “am” is really the “I” designated by Descartes.

Confusing, yes, I know. But in deference to the fluidity and meaning of “mere” words, regardless of what Descartes was actually saying, he was speaking of two abstractions: an “I” as an objective reality and a state of being as “am” as conformation of that reality. It is recognizing these abstractions that we take the first step in defining consciousness as a condition of being aware of a self. This may seem a puzzle right now but it will be un-puzzled as we explore.

Brain and Mind

Almost twenty-five hundred years ago, the Greek physician Hippocrates of Kos managed to tie consciousness to the individual when he designated the brain as the housing for the mind. The mind became associated with the concept of consciousness. Along comes Descartes and cements the idea. Like all profound good things riddled with incomplete information, Descartes also inadvertently renewed a centuries-long search from philosophers and then scientists for a definition of consciousness. That search has lasted for over four hundred years. As befitting the ascendancy of hard science–biology, physiology, physics, and now quantum theory–the mechanics of the brain has emerged as central to the search.

The Metaphysical “I” Becomes Inviolate

Between the death of Hippocrates (around 370 BC) and the birth of Descartes (650 AD), Western philosophy went all-in on the idea that the individual is an autonomous agent (“I”) with a unique Will to shape and direct their lives (the “am” of I think therefore I am, the state of existing, of being).

Hippocrates was by no means the foundation upon which the concept of a corporeal (brain) and metaphysical (‘I”) of human life suffused Western thought. That momentous evolution started in the dark-versus-light religious atmosphere of Zoroastrianism (5th Century BC), especially encapsulated in the rise of Manichaeism in the 3rd century AD, and the emergence and triumph of Christianity (five to six hundred years after the birth of Christ). It is from this base that Descartes espoused the idea of self-awareness. It can be contrasted with the philosophical foundations of Hinduism, the oldest religion in the world. Author Surest Basrur, in the June 9, 2018 article Hindu story offers perspective on nature of consciousness in the TIMES COLONIST offers a nice little simple story illustrating the Hindu view of consciousness.

For the sake of our search for a definition of consciousness, Hippocrates represents a paradigm shift from superstition (nature mysticism) and mysticism (spirits and gods) to the soft science of Descartes (logic) to the hard science of neurology. Of course, hard science appears to be mired in a “mysticism” of its own.

Descartes synthesized circulating ideas to arrive at the definitive idea of I think therefore I am. This synthesizing of ideas is an amazing thing in and of itself. It is worth study in its own right and is very relevant to our search for a definition of consciousness. If anyone does such a study, and I am sure someone already has, they might also want to pursue other novel (as in revolutionary) science concepts and their influence on other sciences and even the pseudo-sciences that spring up around them. Electricity and electromagnetism for instance and the catalog of parapsychology ideas arising from it such as ectoplasm, auras, and mind waves. Then of course there is the advent of computers used as an analogy to explain the seeming dichotomy between Hippocrates’ concept of brain and mind. As the science of quantum physics becomes LESS clear, metaphysics latches onto the fundamentals of probabilistic outcomes and particle entanglement to explain everything–sort of like a theory of everything without the specifics of explaining anything. These explanations include consciousness.

Before Rethinking Consciousness

In chapter three of Daniel Everett’s 2017 book, How Language Began, on page 50, you will run across one of the best near-definitions of consciousness you are likely to encounter.

Discussing the migration of Homo erectus out of Africa, whom he describes as the original imagination-motivated travelers, Everett proposes that consciousness is a state of being not only of awareness but aware of being aware. It is of course the standard I think therefore I am, which we already know. But Everett sees this mental state of being conscious of consciousness as a necessary evolution resulting from Homo erectus evolving from foragers to travelers. If you’re immersed in the endeavors of neuroscience to explain consciousness, this causal relationship between a social behavior–early humans moving across the globe–and consciousness can be rather shocking. Everett is not a neuroscientist and, in our age of experts, his reference to social activity and individual consciousness can be glossed over as merely an interesting observation. But then we turn to the hard science of neuroscience in pursuit of a definition of consciousness and discover this dangling thread–an idea–called social cognition.

The concept of social cognition shoots another idea stream into a potential definition of consciousness. The terrifying specter of an illusion. It is entirely possible that there is no such thing as consciousness. Or, more specifically, the “am” part of I think therefore I am . This is a stretch for neuroscientists however because it is beyond science of any kind.

Donald Hoffman (The Case Against Reality: Why evolution hid the truth from our eyes), a cognitive scientist, launches a fairly effective argument that there is no objective reality and, consequently, consciousness, the perception of consciousness, is merely a biochemical activity of the brain. Consciousness is therefore a sequence of neurological activity resulting in perceptions, including the specific perception of consciousness. (If you’re really paying attention, you may note the circular illogic of this: consciousness is an illusion because the brain generates neurological perceptions resulting in the illusion of consciousness. There really is no definition of consciousness here. There is no there there).

Hoffman posits this idea after, among other things, examining the cognitive results of people who have undergone an operation which severs the nerve connection between the right and left sides of the brain. It is a medical operation called a corpus callosotomy. Odd things can happen after a person gets this operation. The capacity of one individual whose “right hand lit a cigarette and the left put it out” is the foundation from which Hoffman takes up the question of “neural correlates of consciousness” (or NCCs). This is definitely hard science. And like other hard science books on consciousness, it starts the quest for a definition of consciousness from what an individual perceives and what an individual experiences. Hoffman glides into the world of physicality (real world things) where “reality” is like icons on a desktop. From hard science to tributaries of computer algorithmic processors as an analogy.

This has become standard fare in the gestalt of neuroscience. The brain like a computer with inputs. Hoffman gives us a description of consciousness bolstered by the continuing examination of neural correlates of consciousness. We perceive and then we react. Conversely, if you want a description of unconsciousness then you cannot perceive and cannot react. This would essentially be similar to, but definitely not like when you are asleep. More on this later.

Actually Rethinking Consciousness

The most brilliant definition of consciousness I have run across based upon Descartes’ declaration of I think therefore I am to date is Michael S.A. Graziano’s RETHINKING CONSCIOUSNESS¹. Any serious pursuit of a definition must encompass Griziano’s encapsulation of Decartes’ take on consciousness. Like Descartes, Graziano approaches a definition of consciousness from the perspective of the individual. Like Descartes, Graziano gets the “I’ part right but misses the “am” part.

Toward the end of the book (page 123), Graziano defines consciousness without seeming to realize it. He writes:

“I know I’m conscious because I have a direct experience of my own mind. But I’ll never really know if other people are conscious.. . .”

This is more like an extended rendition of I think therefore I am, to include, “you don’t, and maybe you’re not“.

To appreciate this approach to a definition of consciousness you must understand Graziano’s hypothesized internal model he calls the attention schema. It is, as expected, based on subjective experience. No, consciousness is not merely being aware of your environment and being aware of being aware. Consciousness also includes the capacity to direct awareness–the independent agency aspect of consciousness. This of course raises the question I raised in my 2012 book, A Short History Of Memory in which I sought an answer to the question of where dream images come from. What mechanism is the controller of attention when we are dreaming?

On the Cusp of a Revelation of a Definition

The most important contribution Graziano makes in search of a definition of consciousness is pointing out exactly what consciousness is not and cannot be.

On page 109, he provides an enlightening discussion of psychologist William James’ definition of attention¹⁰ .

I see an apple.
I am conscious of the apple.
Michael S. A. Graziano, ReThining Consciousness, page 109

From the neuroscience perspective, this is not a definition of attention.

Graziano makes the distinction between the colloquial William James’ definition and the neuroscience definition of attention. Attention for neuroscience is a process of elimination and promotion and the act of “attention” all takes place at the biochemical level of brain activity. This definition of attention is especially pertinent to the question of where dream images originate. Is there another word that best reflects the neuroscience definition of attention as a complex process? No.

Graziano also makes the distinction between attention and awareness. The point here is that consciousness is not defined as focus, attention and awareness. To define consciousness we must examine origins, especially that “independent agency” directing attention. There is a ready-made scientific–as in neurological–explanation, but there is a missing dot that neurology and most post-Zoroastrianism philosophers leave out.

The two abstractions of Descartes’, I and am, have origins. The attention and awareness with which Graziano is concerned also has an origin. There is no question that Graziano’s subject has a very identifiable origin. All the pursuits of defining consciousness we have encountered here, from philosophy to soft and hard science, approach the subject of consciousness from these abstractions without consideration of the origins.

I think therefore you are.

Where did this I come from? And why must it have anything to do with you? I here really is a peripheral definition of consciousness but with an additional five words clouding the real significance of I. We tie up the dangling unknowns as we continue.

A hint as to what those unknowns are: Life begins with the first breath. Consciousness begins with the first touch.

© Lynard Barnes, 2020